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COMMENT
Don’t Throw the Baby Out with the Bath Water: The Merits
of the Intermediate Approach to the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act
I. Introduction
In the field of securities litigation, Congress and the courts have uniquely
united in their restraint of class actions under the securities laws.1 In 1995,
Congress took action to curb perceived abuses of the securities fraud classaction device by passing the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(Reform Act) over presidential veto.2 The Reform Act severely restricts
securities fraud plaintiffs’ ability to survive a motion to dismiss by
simultaneously heightening the pleading requirements and cutting off access
to discovery while such a motion is pending.3 Following its passage, state
courts saw a dramatic increase in securities fraud litigation as plaintiffs
shifted their forum to pursue claims that could not meet the Reform Act’s
newly heightened requirements.4 Thus, in an effort to ensure that all
securities fraud class actions complied with the heightened requirements of
the Reform Act, Congress passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act of 1998 (Uniform Standards Act).5
1. Michael A. Collora & David M. Osborne, Class-Action Reforms Spur Derivative
Claims; Shareholders Are Taking a Fresh Look at Derivative Suits to Pursue Investor Fraud
Cases, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 15, 1999, at B8 (“The 1990s have been marked by a series of
judicial and legislative efforts to curb securities class actions.”); see also Scott Dodson,
Squeezing Class Actions, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S. BLOG (Aug. 30, 2011, 3:35pm), http://www.
scotusblog.com/2011/08/squeezing-class-actions (“The Supreme Court’s 2010 Term in
particular evinces both skepticism of and hostility to class actions [and] . . . the assault on
class actions is coming so forcefully from all sides.”).
2. John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 335, 335 (1996).
3. Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs,
Defendants and Lawyers, 51 BUS. LAW. 1009, 1015-18 (1996).
4. Ten Things We Know and Ten Things We Don’t Know About the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Joint Written Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the
Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 105th Cong., Part I(2) (1997) [hereinafter Ten
Things We Know], available at http://securities.stanford.edu/research/articles/19970723sen1
.html (statement of Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino).
5. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 [hereinafter Uniform Standards Act] (codified in scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C. §§
77, 78, 80 (2012)).
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Broadly speaking, the Uniform Standards Act prevents class-action
plaintiffs from bringing state-law securities fraud claims, instead forcing such
plaintiffs to use federal laws in federal court and comply with the Reform
Act.6 If defendants assert the applicability of the Uniform Standards Act to a
state court action, the case is removed to federal court to determine whether
the claim is in fact precluded by the Uniform Standards Act.7
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not yet addressed at what point
fraud allegations are sufficient to merit dismissal. As a result, the circuits
have developed three different approaches to measure complaints alleging
fraud or misrepresentation in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security.8 In Brown v. Calamos, the Seventh Circuit provided a
comprehensive critique of the circuit split as well as useful labels for each of
the approaches: the La Sala Approach, Literalist Approach, and Intermediate
Approach.9 Ultimately, the Brown court rejected the very approach this
Comment recommends, the Intermediate Approach, which applies a strict
meaning to the language of the statute but still permits dismissal without
prejudice.10 As such, the Brown decision provides an excellent framework
through which to discuss the shortcomings and strengths of the Intermediate
Approach as compared to the other approaches.
This Comment focuses on how courts should determine the threshold at
which claims allege fraud and misrepresentation in the context of the
Uniform Standards Act and the proper disposal of the claims that do. Part II
reviews the evolution of the role of securities litigation and class actions in
securities regulation, from their inception through the sweeping reforms of
the 1990s. Part III presents the judicial interpretations of the Uniform
Standards Act that bear on determining when claims allege fraud or
misrepresentation. Part IV offers arguments for adopting the Intermediate
Approach and uses the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Brown as a vehicle for
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1) (2012) (amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2012)) (“No covered class action based upon the statutory or
common law of any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in any State or Federal
court by any private party alleging – (A) a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in
connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security; or (B) that the defendant used or
employed any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the
purchase or sale of a covered security.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b)(1) (amending in
essentially identical language the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2012)).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c).
8. Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 127 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2774
(2012).
9. Id. at 127, 131.
10. Id.
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showing why the courts should apply a broad meaning of the Uniform
Standards Act but not foreclose the possibility of dismissing these claims
without prejudice.
II. Evolution of the Role of Securities Litigation: From a Policing Mechanism
to a Perceived Corporate Menace
The benefits of general private rights of action in federal securities
legislation have historically been touted as two-fold.11 First, the private right
of action provides damages to the victim of the wrong.12 Second, the threat of
financial liability for failure to comply with the Securities Act of 1933
(Securities Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)
should incentivize those potentially liable to take care when managing
securities and disclosures.13 Many view the latter as particularly important
given the “limited resources for oversight and enforcement” of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC).14 Still, critics doubt the true value of these
benefits in light of their costs, particularly when the class-action device is
used.15
In the last two decades, controversy has surrounded the lauded value of
securities litigation as a mechanism for making injured investors whole and
promoting compliance with securities regulation.16 Many experts in the field
have suggested that the securities market itself is the best tool for making
investors whole again, particularly if investors diversify their portfolios.17

11. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 745 (6th
ed. 2009).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities
Litigation, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 333, 333 (“Many critics argue that private securities litigation
fails effectively either to deter corporate misconduct or to compensate defrauded
investors.”).
16. See, e.g., Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Fraud Created the Market,
63 ALA. L. REV. 275, 310 (2012) (“The class-action device is vital to deterring securities
fraud and remedying its victims . . . .”); Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering
Prosecutors, and Protecting Managers: Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DUKE
L.J. 945, 976 (1993) (“[D]erivative and class actions survive in their present form even
though there is little evidence that they benefit investors either through monetary recovery or
the deterrence of management from fiduciary breaches or other illegal acts.”).
17. See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, The End of Securities Fraud Class Action?,
REGULATION MAG., Summer 2006, at 46, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/
regulation/regv29n2/v29n1-8.pdf.
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Specifically, these critics have argued “that securities fraud class action suits
were driven by lawyers, not clients; based on stock price movement, not
genuine fear of fraud; seeking quick settlement, not resolution on the merits;
and were unjustly hampering capital formation, not legitimately policing
market malfeasance.”18 Yet others maintain the importance of private rights
of action as incentives for corporations to abide by securities regulation.19
This controversy is most apparent in (A) the evolution of the private cause of
action, (B) the emergence of the class action, (C) the perceived abuses of
securities litigation, and (D) the reforms prompted by those perceived abuses.
A. Holistic Regulation: Judicial Impetus and Congressional Support for the
Original Private Right of Action Under Federal Securities Laws
States promulgated the first securities regulations prior to the Civil War.20
The first antifraud provisions, however, did not appear until the 1910s.21
These state antifraud rules, many of which still exist today, are commonly
referred to as “blue sky laws,” though there exists entertaining disagreement
about the root of this term.22 Notably, these first attempts at regulating
securities fraud were not typically accompanied by private rights of action.23
Instead, blue sky laws were “usually enforced through investigation by State
officers, by criminal prosecutions, or by the issuance of injunctions by the
courts.”24 Even today, not all states (for example, New York) recognize a
private right of action under their blue sky laws.25
18. Shannon Rose Selden, (Self-)Policing the Market: Congress’s Flawed Approach to
Securities Law Reform, 33 J. LEGIS. 57, 72 (2006).
19. See, e.g., Neil Pandey-Jorrin, A Case for Amending the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act: Why Increasing Shareholders’ Rights to Sue Will Help Prevent the Next
Financial Crisis and Better Inform the Investing Public, BUS. L. BRIEF, Spring 2009, at 15,
19 (arguing that reducing plaintiff’s barriers to access private rights of action for securities
fraud will improve corporate transparency).
20. Gerald D. Nash, Government and Business: A Case Study of State Regulation of
Corporate Securities, 1850-1933, 38 BUS. HIST. REV. 144, 146-48 (1964).
21. Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities
Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 279-80 (1998).
22. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70
TEX. L. REV. 347, 359 n.59 (1991) (noting that the term’s origin was already forgotten before
1920 and explaining the lingering arguments that the term derived from “the fly-by-night
operators in Kansas operated so blatantly that they would ‘sell building lots in the blue sky
in fee simple’” or from “the idea that the ‘maker of bad paper might just as well be
capitalizing the blue sky and selling shares therein’”).
23. Nash, supra note 20, at 151.
24. Id.
25. Perino, supra note 21, at 283.
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The stock market crash of October 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression
prompted Congress to enact the first federal securities regulation.26 This
“regulatory overhaul,” which resulted in the passage of the Securities Act and
the Exchange Act, was soon followed by multiple variations of civil
liabilities:
[T]he Securities Act of 1933 expressly provided rights of action
for selling securities without registration or under misleading
registration statements; the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . .
provided express rights of action for participating in price
manipulation, insider trading, and filing false documents; and the
Exchange Act created an implied right of action in a catch-all
prohibition against securities fraud in § 10(b).27
The SEC, established by the Exchange Act, bears primary responsibility for
enforcing securities regulations.28 Like all regulatory bodies, however, the
SEC’s resources are finite.29 As a result, many view private litigation as the
final piece of the puzzle that enables “holistic regulation” of the securities
markets.30 Supporters believe that by pursuing claims beyond the capacity of
the SEC, private enforcement helps ensure that securities fraud does not go
undeterred.31
B. Game Changer: The Introduction of Class Actions
The creation of the modern class-action device in the 1960s significantly
changed the landscape for private securities litigation.32 In fact, “a leading
justification” for the introduction of the modern device was the application of
the class action in securities litigation.33 Most notably, in 1941, Harry Kalven,
Jr. and Maurice Rosenfield advocated for something very close to the modern

26. COX, supra note 11, at 2.
27. Shuenn (Patrick) Ho, A Missed Opportunity for “Wall Street Reform”: Secondary
Liability for Securities Fraud After the Dodd-Frank Act, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 175, 176
(2012) (internal citations omitted).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2012).
29. See COX, supra note 11, at 745.
30. Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 16, at 280.
31. Id.
32. Mordecai Rosenfeld, The Impact of Class Actions on Corporate and Securities Law,
1972 DUKE L.J. 1167, 1167.
33. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS
ACTION 232 (1987).
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class action.34 They argued that representative litigation could be particularly
useful “as a supplement to governmental regulation of large, diffuse markets
like those in securities.”35 They saw the potential for class actions to uniquely
“supplement regulatory agencies both by requiring wrong-doers to give up
their ill-gotten gains and by ferreting out instances of wrong that might have
escaped the regulators’ observance.”36
In 1966, the federal class-action rule, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, was entirely revamped with an eye toward protecting
individuals.37 Following the amendment, federal courts experienced the boom
of the emergence of the class action.38 Drafters of the new Rule 23 had hoped
to attract lawyers to pursue claims on behalf of wronged shareholders by
allowing plaintiffs’ attorneys “to bundle relatively low-value claims” to an
amount worthy of the pursuit of recovery.39 And attract plaintiffs’ lawyers
they did. Immediately, anti-fraud class actions were filed under the 1930s
Securities Acts.40 Plaintiffs’ attorneys saw the class-action device as a
“beneficial” contribution to securities regulation, noting that “financial
statements and press releases are doubtless becoming more accurate because
of the fear of a class action.”41 But even as early as the 1970s, “critics of class
actions . . . asserted that section 10(b) [of the Exchange Act] ha[d] been so
over-used and misused as to demonstrate the unworthiness of the class action
device.”42
In critiquing securities fraud class actions, frequent contributor to
securities academia, Michael Perino, argues that Congress could not have
anticipated the modern landscape of securities litigation when drafting the
securities regulation regime.43 And it is most likely correct that the original
drafters of the 1933 and 1934 Acts did not contemplate class actions in their

34. Id. (citing Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of
the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684 (1941)).
35. Id. (citing Kalven, Jr. & Rosenfield, supra note 34).
36. Id.
37. Rosenfeld, supra note 32, at 1167-68, 1190.
38. Id. at 1167.
39. Judith Resnik, Lessons in Federalism from the 1960s Class Action Rule and the
2005 Class Action Fairness Act: “The Political Safeguards” of Aggregate Translocal
Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1929, 1939 (2007-2008).
40. See Rosenfeld, supra note 32, at 1167.
41. Id. at 1167 (“[P]erhaps the greatest impact of the class action has been its deterrent
effect . . . .”).
42. Id. at 1175.
43. Perino, supra note 21, at 283.
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contemporary form.44 Drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
however, certainly considered the class action’s application to securities
fraud.45
Regardless, by the 1990s, abuses of the securities litigation class action
were at least perceived as rampant (although the degree to which the classaction device was actually abused during that period continues to be a subject
of debate).46 These perceptions eventually led to the judicial and
congressional curtailment of both class actions and private rights of action
under the securities laws.47
C. Strike Suits and Settlements: Perceived Abuses of the Securities Fraud
Class Actions
Howard Sirota, an active plaintiffs’ attorney in securities class actions,
accounted that by the 1990s, although securities fraud class actions were once
acclaimed “as a way of policing the system,” it had become so that “filing a
securities class action [was] akin to molesting a child.”48 Although a
plaintiffs’ attorney, Mr. Sirota condemned the prevalent practice of strike
suits.49 Mr. Sirota claimed that because of these suits by his “so-called
colleagues,” attorneys like him who made a practice by actually uncovering
fraud were “having a harder and harder time convincing judges that a case
[wa]s an actual fraud because too many people ha[d] cried ‘fraud’ for every
earnings disappointment.”50
44. Id. at 283-84. But see Rosenfeld, supra note 32, at 1167 n.3 (1972) (“The original
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective in 1938, but class actions in the United
States date back in time to at least before Equity R. 38, 226 U.S. 659 (1912).”) (citing
Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S.
(16 How.) 288 (1853)).
45. See supra Part II.A.
46. Avery, supra note 2, at 339.
47. See infra Parts II.C, III.
48. Diana B. Henriques, Making It Harder for Investors to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10,
1995, § 3, at 5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/10/business/investing-itmaking-it-harder-for-investors-to-sue.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm
(quoting
Howard
Sirota, a plaintiffs’ attorney with a record of major successful securities class actions).
49. Id. “Strike suits” refer to suits that “mak[e] charges without regard to their truth so
as to coerce corporate managers to settle worthless claims in order to get rid of them.”
Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 371 (1966). In the context of securities fraud
litigation, strike suits specifically refer to cases that obtain settlement value because of the
high price of discovery, even though they were filed in response to mere stock price drops
without any affirmative showing of wrongdoing. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995),
as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730.
50. Henriques, supra note 48, at 5.
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By the 1990s, lobbyists of emerging Silicon Valley technology firms stood
at the forefront of the debate leading to reforms, claiming that plaintiffs’
class-action attorneys had inflicted meritless securities fraud suits on “[m]ore
than half of the top 150 Silicon Valley firms.”51 The assertion, however,
presents quite a proof problem. Because most of these “meritless” suits were
settled to avoid litigation, it is unclear how often firms settled with
knowledge of the claims’ merits. As some securities class-action attorneys
stated in the 1990s, “the corporate habit of settling cases instead of fighting
them before a judge or jury can make even specious fraud claims look
valid.”52 Simultaneously, opponents of securities litigation reform pointed to
the benefits of securities litigation as a deterrent that allowed corporate
attorneys to incentivize their clients to comply with the regulations.53 They
also attempted to persuade Congress of the private action’s positive impact
on the financial markets by pointing to increasing numbers of initial public
offerings and successful exposure of fraudulent practices leading to investor
compensation for wrongs.54
Naturally, many companies would be induced to settle even a meritless
securities fraud case if it survived a motion to dismiss, as avoiding discovery
alone can allow the companies to avoid approximately 80 percent of the costs
of the action in some cases.55 That said, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt
confessed the difficulty in “measure[ing] how prevalent strike suits are, or
even [determining] whether the problem is any more serious today than it

51. G. Pascal Zachary & Jill Abramson, Silicon Volley: High-Tech Firms Rush to Fund
a Pet Cause: Chill All the Lawyers – A Former Intuit Ace Leads California Battle to Curb
Lawsuits and Huge Fees – Finding Rewards in Politics, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 1996, at A1.
52. Henriques, supra note 48, at 4.
53. See, e.g., Securities Litigation Reform Proposals S.240, S.667, and H.R. 1058:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs,
104th Cong. 207, at 195 (1995) [hereinafter Reform Act Senate Hearings] (statement of
Sheldon H. Elsen, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York) (recalling his
experience as a young associate when, after neither case law nor ethics could dissuade a
client from violating securities law, being told that if the client “‘insist[s] on going ahead
with the deal, tell them that, if they do, Abe Pomerantz will sue them. That’s the only thing
that will stop them.’”).
54. See id. at 206 (statement of Mark J. Griffin, Director of Commerce Division, Utah
Department of Commerce, North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc.)
(quoting STAFF OF S. SUBCOMM. ON SECS. OF THE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS. & URBAN
AFFAIRS, 103D CONG., PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION 10 (Comm. Print 1994).
55. See id. at 52 n.17 (statement of J. Carter Reese, Jr., Chairman, Capital Markets
Regulatory Reform Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies).
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was ten or twenty years ago.”56 Moreover, the Congressional Research
Service study on the subject proved inconclusive, determining that the
pervasiveness of strike suits was “less than clear.”57
Prior to the 1990s reforms, the U.S. Supreme Court also perceived and
responded to increasing instances of abuse. For instance, in Central Bank of
Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., the Court held that a
private right of action did not exist for an “aiding and abetting suit under §
10(b).”58 This occurred after both “the courts and the SEC” recognized this
private right of action in “hundreds of judicial and administrative proceedings
in every Circuit in the federal system.”59 Similarly in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,
in a 5-4 decision the Court limited the private right of action for a fraudulent
prospectus only to public offerings by the issuer, despite the express
provisions in section 12(2) of the Securities Act.60 Justice Thomas’s dissent,
which was joined by Justices Scalia, Breyer, and Ginsberg, accused the
majority of being “motivated by its policy preferences” and “assum[ing] that
Congress could never have intended to impose liability on sellers engaged in
secondary transactions.”61 Still today, the Court continues to be suspicious of
the merit of securities class actions.62
D. The Reforms Prompted by the Perceived Abuses: The Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998
1. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
In response to the concern regarding the perceived abuses of securities
litigation, particularly the class-action device, Congress enacted the Reform
Act over presidential veto in 1995.63 The Reform Act applies to class actions,

56. Avery, supra note 2, at 340 (quoting Arthur Levitt, Private Litigation Under the
Federal Securities Laws, Address at the Securities Regulation Institute 3 (Jan. 26, 1994) (on
file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law)).
57. Id. at 340 n.21 (citing GARY W. SHORTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95-656E,
SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM: HAVE FRIVOLOUS SHAREHOLDER SUITS EXPLODED?, at
CRS-34 (May 16, 1995)).
58. 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994), superseded in part by statute, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e).
59. Id. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60. 513 U.S. 561, 580 (1995).
61. Id. at 594 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
62. Dodson, supra note 1 (“The Supreme Court’s 2010 Term in particular evinces both
skepticism of and hostility to class actions [and] . . . the assault on class actions is coming so
forcefully from all sides.”).
63. Avery, supra note 2, at 337-38, 352-53.
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but it only applies to class actions filed in federal court.64 Some of the Act’s
most noted provisions include (1) a heightened pleading requirement for
claims brought under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 of
the related SEC rules,65 (2) a discovery stay pending motions to dismiss,66 (3)
mandatory sanctions for Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) violations,67
and (4) lead-plaintiff designation requirements.68 Additionally, the Reform
Act created a safe harbor for forward-looking statements, which reduced the
potential liability for predictive statements.69
President Clinton vetoed the bill, despite his support of its goals, because
of his concerns that it would shut out plaintiffs with legitimate claims.70 He
specifically stated his objections to the heightened pleading requirements as
posing “an unacceptable procedural hurdle to meritorious claims,” the low
standard for cautionary language that would entitle defendants to use the
forward-looking statement safe harbor, and the mandatory Rule 11 sanctions
as coming “too close to the ‘loser pays’ standard.”71
Purportedly, the Reform Act was aimed at the specific evils of strike suits,
namely greedy lawyers and professional plaintiffs.72 The Reform Act,
however, severely restricted the ability of all class-action plaintiffs to survive
a motion to dismiss by limiting access to discovery and increasing the
pleading requirements.73 Prior to enactment of the Reform Act, all securities
64. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (2012).
65. See id. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B) (“[T]he complaint shall specify each statement alleged to
have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an
allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information and belief, the
complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.”); id. § 78u4(b)(2)(A) (“[T]he complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate
this chapter, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind.”); see also Selden, supra note 18, at 76.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3); see also Selden, supra note 18, at 76.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c) (requiring a court to “include in the record specific findings
regarding compliance” with “Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” and to
“impose sanctions” upon a finding of a violations).
68. Id. § 78u-4(a)(3); see also Selden, supra note 18, at 76.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (2012) (amending the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a77pp (2012)); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c) (2012) (amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2012)).
70. William J. Clinton, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995—Veto Message
from the President of the United States, H.R. DOC. NO. 104-150, reprinted in 141 CONG.
REC. H15214 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995).
71. Id.
72. See Selden, supra note 18, at 72.
73. Phillips, supra note 3, at 1015-18.
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fraud claims were already subject to the heightened pleading standards of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which requires that “a party must state
with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”74 The
higher standards created by the Reform Act “insis[t] that securities fraud
complaints ‘specify’ each misleading statement; that they set forth the facts
‘on which [a] belief’ that a statement is misleading was ‘formed’; and that
they ‘state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind.’”75 These hurdles have posed
and continue to pose challenges to all plaintiffs, whether or not their claims
lack merit.
Nineteen months after the passage of the Reform Act, the securities
landscape remained essentially unchanged.76 Overall, the aggregated state
and federal litigation rates following 1995 remained constant and were
consistent with the rates of litigation prior to the passage of the Reform Act.77
Those statistics, however, encompassed “a significant shift” of litigation to
state court,78 whereas prior to the Reform Act, securities class actions were
filed almost exclusively in federal court.79 Additionally, a new defendant
emerged in these state-court actions.80 While approximately 89% of the suits
filed prior to the Reform Act were filed against non-publicly traded
companies, 81.5% of the suits filed after the Reform Act targeted defendants
that “trade[d] on national markets.”81 Perhaps most relevant to the goals of
the Reform Act’s drafters, the average drop in stock price as a result of filings
jumped from 19% prior to the Reform Act to 31% after, which can be
interpreted to indicate that a greater number of these suits were meritorious.82
In contrast, this can also be interpreted to indicate that the market was giving
more weight to claims filed because the Reform Act purported to weed out

74. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b); Selden, supra note 18, at 74.
75. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u4(b)(1), (2) (2012)).
76. Ten Things We Know, supra note 4, at Part I(1).
77. Id.
78. Id. at Part I(2). For a more in-depth review of the early effects of the Reform Act,
see Edward Brodsky, Discovery Abuses: A Shifting Target?, White-Collar Crime Rep.
(Bloomberg BNA), July/Aug. 1997, at 1, available at Westlaw, 11 No. 7 ANWCCR 1.
79. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 82 (2006) (citing
H.R. REP. NO. 105-640, at 10 (1998); S. REP. NO. 105-182, pp. 3-4 (1998)).
80. See Ten Things We Know, supra note 4, at Part I(2).
81. Id.
82. Id. at Part I(4).
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meritless claims. Of all of these emerging realities, it was the dramatic shift
of litigation from federal court to state court that most concerned Congress.83
Unsurprisingly, another great debate emerged about what caused that
shift.84 Advocates of further reform accounted for this shift by pointing to the
motives for plaintiffs’ attorneys to avoid the Reform Act by filing in state
court rather than federal court.85 They referred to this as “[s]trategic
evasion.”86 Professor Grundfest of Stanford University explained:
Plaintiffs could, without limitation, pursue state litigation in order
to: (1) take discovery that would be prohibited by a federal stay;
(2) avoid defenses available pursuant to the federal forwardlooking safe harbor; (3) plead cases where the facts alleged would
be insufficient to avoid dismissal in a federal court; (4) avoid the
need for the designation of a lead plaintiff; or (5) avoid heightened
scrutiny of settlement terms.87
On the other hand, a leading plaintiffs’ counsel at the time enumerated many
“legitimate” reasons why a plaintiff would choose state court over federal
court, particularly after the passage of the Reform Act:
[M]any state courts permit plaintiffs to recover on a 9-to-3 jury
vote, as opposed to unanimous verdicts required in the federal
system; many state laws permit a recovery upon a showing of
negligence, as opposed to recklessness or intentional misconduct,
and some states permit recovery without any showing of
reliance.88
Regardless of any potential legitimacy in the shift to state court, the result
was congressional action in the form of the Uniform Standards Act.89
2. The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
In enacting the Uniform Standards Act, the 105th Congress found that, to
avoid the strategic evasion of the Reform Act, “it is appropriate to enact
83. See Uniform Standards Act, supra note 5 (“An Act To amend the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to limit the conduct of securities class actions
under State law, and for other purposes.”).
84. See, e.g., Brodsky, supra note 78, at 2.
85. Ten Things We Know, supra note 4, at Part III.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citations omitted).
88. Id. (quoting William S. Lerach, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 1995 [sic]
1 & 1/2 Years Later at 11 (n.d.) (alteration omitted) (on file with Grundfest & Perino)).
89. See Uniform Standards Act, supra note 5.
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national standards for securities class action lawsuits involving nationally
traded securities, while preserving the appropriate enforcement powers of
State securities regulators and not changing the current treatment of
individual lawsuits.”90 Plaintiffs’ attorneys had successfully avoided the
requirements of the Reform Act by filing state-law actions in state court.91 As
a result, Congress aimed the Uniform Standards Act at preventing class
actions from utilizing those schemes.92 Under the Uniform Standards Act,
plaintiffs are barred from bringing “class-actions that (1) consist of more than
fifty prospective members; (2) assert state-law claims; (3) involve a
nationally listed security; and (4) allege ‘an untrue statement or omission of a
material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of’ that security.”93
Contrary to the characterization of many courts, 94 the Uniform Standards Act
does not preclude state law, but rather precludes plaintiffs from using the
class-action device to bring certain state-law claims.95 This approach reflects
Congress’s “underlying assumptions: that class actions (not state securities
laws) are dangerous and federal law must rein them in.”96
90. Id.
91. See Michael A. Rosenhouse, Validity, Construction, and Operation of Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 2 A.L.R. FED. 2D 1, 20 (2005).
92. See id.
93. Atkinson v. Morgan Asset Mgmt., Inc., 658 F.3d 549, 552 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting
15 U.S.C. § 77p(b), (f)(2)(A), (f)(3)). The Uniform Standards Act provides exceptions from
its preclusion to “certain class actions based on the law of the State in which the issuer of the
covered security is incorporated, actions brought by a state agency or state pension plan,
actions under contracts between issuers and indenture trustees, and derivative actions
brought by shareholders on behalf of a corporation.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 87 (2006) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78bb(f)(3)(A)-(C), (f)(5)(C)).
94. See, e.g., Dixon v. ATI Ladish LLC, 667 F.3d 891, 894 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that
the Uniform Standards Act preempts “most state-law securities suits brought as class
actions”); Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 305 (3d Cir. 2005)
(stating that the Uniform Standards Act “does not preempt particular ‘claims’ or ‘counts’ but
rather preempts ‘actions’”) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1)); Behlen v. Merrill Lynch, 311
F.3d 1087, 1092 (11th Cir. 2002) (“To that end, the [Uniform Standards Act] preempts
certain state law claims, allows for removal of state actions to federal court, and requires
immediate dismissal of ‘covered lawsuits.’”) (citing Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d 1334, 1341 (11th Cir. 2002)).
95. See Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 636 n.1 (2006) (“The preclusion
provision is often called a preemption provision; the [Uniform Standards Act], however,
does not itself displace state law with federal law but makes some state-law claims
nonactionable through the class-action device in federal as well as state court.”).
96. Selden, supra note 18, at 79 (citing A.C. Pritchard, Constitutional Federalism,
Individual Liberty, and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 78 WASH.
U. L.Q. 435, 437 (2000)).
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The procedural application of the Uniform Standards Act is unusual.97
Normally, when federal law preempts state law, a state court will determine
whether the particular claim has been preempted.98 In contrast, the federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether the Uniform
Standards Act precludes plaintiffs’ action.99 Presumably, this was intended to
avoid extensive state-law disagreement about when these suits were
precluded.100 Even though the plaintiffs may have filed a state-law claim in
state court, by filing a claim that meets the requirements of the Uniform
Standards Act “the plaintiff has necessarily invoked federal question
jurisdiction.”101 As a result, when defendants assert the applicability of the
Uniform Standards Act, the case is removed to federal court to determine
whether the action is in fact precluded by the Uniform Standards Act.102 Once
the claim has been removed to federal court, “the court must dismiss for
failure to state a claim because [the Uniform Standards Act] has preempted
[sic] the state law basis for the claim.”103 Because of the nature of the
removal process, the claim may be subject to dismissal with prejudice before
the plaintiffs ever have the opportunity to amend their complaint.104
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on when a pleading
has alleged a misrepresentation, the Court has provided some guidance as to
how the Act might be interpreted generally.105 In Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
97. See Selden, supra note 18, at 79.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. (“Congress (and the corporate lobby) feared that if class actions alleging state
fraud claims were preempted but not removed, extensive litigation over whether or not the
claims were covered could still continue in state court.”).
101. 15A DAVID A. LIPTON, BROKER-DEALER REGULATION § 5:16 (2012) (citing Felton
v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 429 F. Supp. 2d 684, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c) (2012).
103. LIPTON, supra note 101, § 5:16 (citing Felton, 429 F. Supp. at 692). Note that under
the Uniform Standards Act, plaintiffs may still bring a federal claim in state court without
removal as the Uniform Standards Act only precludes state-law claims. Id. (citing IRRA v.
Lazard Ltd., No. 05 CV 3388 RJDRML, 2006 WL 2375472, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)).
104. See, e.g. Atkinson v. Morgan Asset Mgmt., Inc., 658 F.3d 549, 556 (6th Cir. 2011)
(dismissing with prejudice even though plaintiffs “had no chance to request amendment
prior to the court’s dismissal”).
105. It is possible that this precedent may change or be clarified in the near future, as the
Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari on a series of consolidated cases on the issue
of whether “a covered state law class action complaint that unquestionably alleges ‘a’
mispresentation ‘in connection with’ the purchase or sale of a SLUSA-covered security
nonetheless can escape the application of SLUSA by including other allegations that are
farther removed from a covered securities transaction.” United States Supreme Court,
Question Presented Report No. 12-86 (Jan. 18, 2013), available at http://www.
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Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, the Supreme Court addressed whether the
claims made by holders of securities were “‘in connection with the purchase
or sale’ of securities.”106 In determining that holder claims are precluded by
the Uniform Standards Act, the Supreme Court broadly interpreted the
Uniform Standard Act’s language.107
The Court ultimately concluded that “[a] narrow reading of the [Uniform
Standards Act] would undercut the effectiveness of the 1995 Reform Act and
thus run contrary to [the Uniform Standard Act]’s stated purpose.”108 It based
this determination on a number of factors within the Uniform Standards Act
itself. The Court pointed to the numerous exceptions to the preclusion
provided within the statute, which “make[] it inappropriate for courts to
create additional, implied exceptions.”109 Further, because the Uniform
Standard Act’s preclusion “does not actually pre-empt any state cause of
action” but rather only “denies plaintiffs the right to use the class-action
device to vindicate certain claims,” the Court determined it is unnecessary to
interpret the statute narrowly as it might otherwise in a federal preemption
situation.110 Additionally, because state law had not been the traditional
“vehicle for asserting class-action securities fraud claims,”111 the Court chose
to read the preclusive sweep broadly and noted that the Uniform Standards
Act does not preempt “a historically entrenched state-law remedy.”112 As a
result, Dabit is now characterized as directing courts to “broadly interpret
[the Uniform Standards Act] in order to carry out the congressional intent to
limit abusive class actions.”113 The broad interpretation of an already broad
statute has resulted in mixed circuit court interpretations of the ambiguous
provisions.

supremecourt.gov/qp/12-00086qp.pdf (granting certiorari on Chadbourne & Parke LLP v.
Troice, Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice, and Willis of Colorado Inc. v. Troice for the October
2013 Term).
106. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 83-84 (2006)
(finding undisputed “that the complaint alleg[ed] misrepresentation and omissions of
material facts”).
107. See id. at 88-89.
108. Id. at 86.
109. Id. at 87-88; see also supra note 93 and accompanying text.
110. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 87.
111. Id. at 88 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 14 (1998) (Conf. Rep.)).
112. Id.
113. Jennifer J. Johnson, Securities Class Actions in State Court, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 349,
356 (2011) (citing Dabit, 547 U.S. at 85).
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III. The Circuit Split About Whether a Complaint Has Alleged Fraud or
Misrepresentation: The Literalist, La Sala, and Intermediate Approaches
Because the Supreme Court has not addressed the “allegation of
misrepresentation” element of Uniform Standards Act preclusion, the issue
has been left with the federal appellate courts for resolution. The circuits have
generated three distinct tests.114 In Brown v. Calamos, Judge Posner outlined
and titled these three approaches: the Literalist Approach, La Sala Approach,
and Intermediate Approach.115 This section reviews each of the approaches in
turn.
A. The La Sala Approach: Plaintiffs’ Friend
The Third Circuit’s La Sala Approach, established in La Sala v. Bordier et
Cie,116 is by far the friendliest to plaintiffs of the three interpretations.
According to this approach, “[I]f proof of a misrepresentation or of a material
omission is inessential to the plaintiff’s success, the allegation is no bar to the
suit.”117 In other words, this approach differentiates between an inessential
allegation and an allegation that may have bearing on the outcome of the
case, even if it does not prove an essential element. The latter will bring the
case under the purview of Uniform Standards Act, but the former will permit
the case to continue.118 But La Sala was not the Third Circuit’s first
encounter with the misrepresentation element of the Uniform Standards Act.
In fact, it first confronted the issue in Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney,
Inc., in which it issued an arguably contradictory holding.119
The plaintiffs in Rowinski alleged multiple state theories of liability
deriving from their chief allegation that the defendant, an investment
brokerage firm, had dispersed research that was “biased in favor of the firm’s
investment banking clients, to the detriment of its retail brokerage
customers.”120 The district court dismissed the claims finding them precluded
by the Uniform Standards Act following removal from state court.121
The Third Circuit agreed with the lower court’s reasoning that the Uniform
Standards Act precluded the claim because it “alleged a misrepresentation or
114. See Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 127 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
2774 (2012).
115. Id.
116. 519 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2008).
117. Brown, 664 F.3d at 127.
118. Id.
119. 398 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2005).
120. Id. at 296.
121. Id.
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omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a
covered security.”122 The plaintiffs contended that the breach of contract
claims should be allowed to proceed because misrepresentation is not an
element of breach of contract claims.123 The Third Circuit rejected their
argument for two reasons.124 First, after investigating the plain language of
the statute, the court determined that preclusion occurs when any of the
Uniform Standards Act’s “prerequisites are ‘alleged’ in one form or
another.”125 Second, the court recognized that allowing allegations of fraud
and misrepresentation to trigger preclusion only when essential to the statelaw claims’ elements threatens Congress’s intent that the “bill be interpreted
broadly.”126 Ultimately, the Rowinski court held that “the misrepresentation
prong is satisfied under [the Uniform Standards Act]” when “allegations of a
material misrepresentation serve as the factual predicate of a state law
claim.”127
Three years after Rowinski, a panel of three different Third Circuit judges
presided over La Sala v. Bordier et Cie and developed what Judge Posner
labeled as the La Sala Approach.128 In La Sala, the plaintiffs were trustees of
a trust created in the bankruptcy proceedings of AremisSoft, whose demise
began when high-level directors “executed a classic ‘pump and dump’
scheme.”129 To settle a federal securities class action in response to the pump
and dump scheme, which was filed prior to the bankruptcy proceeding, a plan
was implemented giving all the individual and group claims from the class
action to a state-law trust.130 The trust was then “responsible for prosecuting
and distributing to the [original claimants] the proceeds of all of the
claims.”131 The two trustees filed suit in district court alleging claims for
“aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty” and “violating Swiss moneylaundering laws.”132 The district court dismissed the claims, finding the
action precluded by the Uniform Standards Act because it was a class action

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 297.
Id. at 300.
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1)).
Id.
Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 8 (1998), available at 1998 WL 226714).
Id.
La Sala v. Bordier et Cie, 519 F.3d 121, 126 (3d Cir. 2008).
Id. at 126-27.
Id.
Id. at 127.
Id.
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and contained allegations of “misrepresentations in connection with securities
trades.”133
The Third Circuit reversed the holding of the district court primarily
because it determined the action was not a class action, and therefore the
Uniform Standards Act could not apply.134 The court nonetheless continued
its analysis to assess whether the foreign-law claims were precluded by the
Uniform Standards Act.135 The Third Circuit elucidated the holding in
Rowinski, explaining that the misrepresentation element of Uniform
Standards Act preclusion is satisfied “when an allegation of a
misrepresentation in connection with a securities trade is a ‘factual predicate’
of the claim, even if misrepresentation is not a legal element of the claim.”136
Specifically, the court stated that Rowinski did not hold that all allegations of
misrepresentation would operate to satisfy the misrepresentation element of
the Uniform Standards Act.137 Although technically dicta, the Third Circuit
explained that in La Sala, the misrepresentations alleged in reference to the
Swiss-law claims failed to implicate the misrepresentation element because
the facts were “merely background details that need not have been alleged,
and need not be proved.”138 As a result, through La Sala the Third Circuit
developed an approach through which the pleadings could include allegations
of fraud but nonetheless survive Uniform Standards Act preclusion.
B. The Literalist Approach: Bright-Line Rough Justice
According to the Literalist Approach, if a complaint alleges “‘a
misrepresentation or . . . omission of a material fact in connection with the
purchase or sale of a covered security,’” the inquiry ends there.139 The case
should be dismissed with prejudice, regardless of the importance of the
allegation of omission or misrepresentation to the plaintiffs’ claim.140 The
133. Id. at 129.
134. Id. at 132-33, 135. Based on its investigation of legislative history and the text of the
Uniform Standards Act, the court determined that the district court erred in deeming the
action a class-action because a trust should not be interpreted to include all of its members.
Id. at 134-36 (citing S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 8 (1998); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78bb(f)(5)(B)(i),
78bb(f)(5)(C), 78bb(f)(5)(D)).
135. Id. at 140-41.
136. Id. at 141 (quoting Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 300 (3d
Cir. 2005)).
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 127 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2774
(2012).
140. Id.
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Sixth Circuit developed this plaintiff-hostile approach in Segal v. Fifth Third
Bank, N.A.,141 and it applied and expanded the approach in Atkinson v.
Morgan Asset Management.142 Judge Posner labeled this the Literalist
Approach presumably because it commands a literal interpretation of the
language in the Uniform Standards Act without permitting any room for
plaintiff error.
In Segal, the plaintiffs were beneficiaries of trust accounts handled by the
defendants.143 Among many allegations, the plaintiffs’ amended complaint
asserted that defendants, who were a bank and its holding company, had
misrepresented the management style of the trust funds, “intentionally and
‘knowingly overcharged’ its trust clients,” withheld from investors that “their
trust accounts would be invested in proprietary mutual funds,” and “made
misrepresentations to the trust beneficiaries and otherwise manipulated them
‘in connection with’ the sale of [the bank’s] mutual funds.”144 The plaintiffs,
however, included in their amended complaint the following statement:
“None of the causes of action stated herein are based upon any
misrepresentation or failure to disclose material facts to plaintiff.”145 The
district court nonetheless dismissed the case for failure to state a claim,
finding that all claims contained within the complaint were barred by the
Uniform Standards Act.146
The only issue on appeal to the Sixth Circuit was whether the complaint
included allegations of a misrepresentation “‘in connection with the purchase
or sale’ of [the bank’s] mutual funds.”147 The court held that the Uniform
Standards Act bars complaints that include allegations of fraud or
misrepresentation, “pure and simple.”148 It declined to give weight to the
plaintiffs’ disclaimer that their claims were not based on material
misrepresentations, clarifying that the Uniform Standards Act precludes
actions that “cover[] the prohibited theories, no matter what words are used
(or disclaimed) in explaining them.”149 The circuit court, relying on the Dabit
Court’s call for a broad construction, specifically rejected the interpretation
that the Uniform Standards Act only precludes claims that depend on
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

581 F.3d 305, 311 (6th Cir. 2009).
658 F.3d 549, 554-55 (6th Cir. 2011).
Segal, 581 F.3d at 308.
Id. at 310.
Id.
Id. at 308.
Id. at 309.
Id. at 311.
Id.
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allegations of fraud or misrepresentation.150 It also specifically rejected the La
Sala Approach, discussed supra, noting that the La Sala interpretation of the
Uniform Standards Act was only dicta and, furthermore, that it contradicted
earlier Third Circuit precedent.151
Two years later, the Sixth Circuit seized an opportunity to reiterate its
adherence to the approach it adopted in Segal. In Atkinson, the plaintiffs filed
thirteen state-law claims following the 2008 stock crisis, alleging losses due
to fraud.152 Their claims included “breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and
negligent misrepresentation.”153 The plaintiffs’ first allegation was that the
“[d]efendants ‘failed[ed] to provide truthful and complete information about
the Funds’ portfolios.’”154 The plaintiffs argued that in order for the Uniform
Standards Act to bar a complaint, the claim must “require fraud as a
necessary element.”155 The district court disagreed in light of the rule
established in Segal that the Uniform Standards Act “precludes [p]laintiffs’
claims because they include allegations of misrepresentations and omissions
‘pure and simple.’”156
On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the plaintiffs challenged the district court’s
dismissal with prejudice, claiming that they should still be allowed to amend
their complaint to avoid Uniform Standards Act preclusion “by either
removing the fraud allegations from their claims or shaving their class to less
than fifty plaintiffs.”157 The plaintiffs experienced particular frustratation
because they never had an opportunity to amend their complaint as the
federal district court dismissed the action sua sponte upon receiving the
plaintiffs’ motion to remand.158 Although declining official appellate review
because the plaintiffs had not raised the issue below, the Sixth Circuit
nonetheless responded to their concern by explaining the Uniform Standards
Act process: “Once a [Uniform Standards Act]-covered action is removed
and a plaintiff moves to remand, a motion to dismiss becomes unnecessary
because . . . remand itself poses a ‘jurisdictional issue.’”159 Because the court
150. Id. (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 86
(2006)).
151. Id. at 312 (citing Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 300 (3d
Cir. 2005)). Discussion of the La Sala approach may be found supra Part III.A.
152. Atkinson v. Morgan Asset Mgmt., Inc., 658 F.3d 549, 552 (6th Cir. 2011).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 554.
155. Id. at 555.
156. Id. (citing Segal, 581 F.3d at 311).
157. Id. at 556.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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interpreted the dismissal as jurisdictional but dismissed the case with
prejudice, the result was that neither federal nor state courts could hear the
plaintiffs’ complaints. As a result, a pleading in a circuit exercising this
approach risks dismissal if it includes any allegation of fraud or
misrepresentation.
C. The Intermediate Approach: High Standards with a Parachute
Judge Posner characterized the Ninth Circuit’s hybrid approach to
analyzing allegations of misrepresentation as the “Intermediate Approach.”160
This functions essentially the same as the Literalist Approach, but instead of
dismissing with prejudice, the suit is dismissed without prejudice to allow the
plaintiffs the opportunity to craft their complaint to eliminate the allegations
of fraud.161 If the plaintiffs’ claims could survive without the allegations of
fraud, the plaintiffs can resubmit their complaint without those allegations.
In Stoody-Broser v. Bank of America, N.A., the Ninth Circuit applied
traditional procedural rules to determine that dismissal without prejudice is
permissible for claims precluded by the Uniform Standards Act.162 Prior to
Stoody-Broser, Ninth Circuit case law had already established when a
misrepresentation rises to the level of precluding the suit. In Proctor v. Vishay
Intertechnology, Inc., the Ninth Circuit read decisions by other circuits,
including Segal and Rowinski, as holding that “[m]isrepresentation need not
be a specific element of the claim to fall within the [Uniform Standard Act]’s
preclusion.”163
In Stoody-Broser, a Ninth Circuit panel reviewed a case where the district
court had dismissed the claims with prejudice upon finding that the claims
were barred by the Uniform Standards Act.164 The Ninth Circuit quickly
upheld dismissal of the claims, pointing to direct allegations of omissions that
had financially benefitted the defendants.165 It only departed from the district
court in determining whether to dismiss without prejudice.166 The court
considered circuit precedent, which stated that leave to amend should be
granted “unless it is clear, upon de novo review, that the complaint could not
160. Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 127 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2774
(2012).
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Gregory Kendall, Comment, The Artful Dodgers: Securities Fraud, Artful
Pleading, and Preemption of State Law Causes of Action, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 657, 668
(2012).
163. 584 F.3d 1208, 1222 n.13 (9th Cir. 2009).
164. Stoody-Broser v. Bank of Am., N.A., 442 F. App’x 247, 248 (9th Cir. 2011).
165. Id.
166. Id.
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be saved by any amendment.”167 However, the court determined that it was
foreseeable that the Uniform Standards Act might not preclude a claim for
“violation of a trust administrator’s fiduciary duty to the trust’s beneficiaries
even where that violation involves trading in covered securities.”168 The court
also recognized that in order for such a claim to survive Uniform Standards
Act preclusion, the complaint must refrain from alleging “either expressly or
implicitly, misrepresentations, omissions, or fraudulent practices coincidental
to the violation.”169 As a result, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the earlier
dismissal while allowing leave to amend.170
Although the Brown opinion only cites the Ninth Circuit as permitting
amendment post-removal,171 the Ninth Circuit is not the only circuit to permit
amendments to a claim that might otherwise be precluded by the Uniform
Standards Act.172 For example, in Green v. Ameritrade, Inc., the Eighth
Circuit reviewed a district court’s decision to remand a case back to state
court when the plaintiffs’ amended complaint no longer included allegations
implicating Uniform Standards Act preclusion.173 The court specifically
rejected the merit of the defendant’s protests “that ‘the essence of the
Plaintiff’s securities fraud claim, which the district court originally found to
be preempted, ha[d] not changed,’” determining instead that the amended
complaint no longer implicated the Uniform Standards Act.174 It held that the
district court properly exercised its “broad discretion” in determining to
remand the case to state court “[h]aving found no basis for [Uniform
Standards Act] preemption of the amended complaint.”175
IV. Analysis: Why Intermediate Is Best
A. To Best Serve the Policies Behind and the Text of the Uniform Standards
Act, Courts Should Adopt the Intermediate Approach
The Intermediate Approach appropriately balances the objectives
explicitly and implicitly stated by Congress in the Uniform Standards Act.
Besides allowing for dismissal without prejudice, the Intermediate Approach
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
(2012).
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. (quoting Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2002)).
Id. at 249.
Id.
Id.
Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 127 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2774
Kendall, supra note 162, at 668.
279 F.3d 590, 594 (8th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 599 (quoting from Br. of Appellants at 3).
Id.
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functions essentially the same as the Literalist Approach. Both approaches
command dismissal if an allegation of fraud or misrepresentation coinciding
with purchases or sales of securities is present in the complaint, regardless of
the importance of the allegation to the plaintiffs’ underlying claims.176 This
comports with the Supreme Court’s mandate in Dabit that the Uniform
Standards Act be interpreted broadly because a broad interpretation of
“alleging fraud or misrepresentation” captures any allegation of fraud or
misrepresentation.177
The La Sala Approach should be rejected because it requires federal
judges to make an in-depth inquiry into state-law claims at the pleading stage
and determine the mortality of the suit. Such an inquiry itself is contrary to
the policy goals of the Uniform Standards Act and the Reform Act. These
acts were designed in large part to alleviate the costs associated with
defending meritless suits.178 A judicial practice of assessing the underlying
merits requires that defense and plaintiff attorneys alike spend time (and
clients’ money) briefing and presenting more information than necessary to
the ruling at hand.
Essentially, the Uniform Standards Act and the Reform Act lose much of
their cachet if they cannot be applied quickly and easily. It is for this reason
that the Intermediate Approach is the interpretation that is most respectful of
the policy objectives of the Uniform Standards Act.
Still, such a broad interpretation of the preclusive sweep will likely result
in the dismissal of claims that could foreseeably continue in state court.179
Such a harsh standard should not be carried beyond the express mandate of
the text. Nowhere in the text does the Uniform Standards Act prohibit
amendments post-removal.180 In fact, there is “statutory silence” regarding
whether amendments to complaints should be allowed.181 And broadly
interpreting silence is akin to multiplying zero. Rather, the appropriate
176. Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 127 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2774
(2012).
177. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 86 (2006).
178. See Selden, supra note 18, at 72.
179. See Brown, 664 F.3d at 129. In Brown, Judge Posner acknowledged the case could
have been successfully re-filed in state court as a derivative suit but nonetheless dismissed
with prejudice. Id. at 125, 129, 131.
180. See U.S. Mortg., Inc. v. Saxton, 494 F.3d 833, 842-43 (9th Cir. 2007), abrogated on
other grounds by Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology, Inc., 584 F.3d 1208, 1226-27 (9th Cir.
2009) (“However, Congress included no express prohibition against amendment and no
court has held that [the Uniform Standards Act] completely and categorically bars any
amendment of the complaint following removal.”).
181. Id. at 843.
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approach would be to assume that the statute was created against the
backdrop of the general rules concerning dismissals with and without
prejudice and thus permit leave to amend. Simultaneously, courts should
reject the Literalist Approach because it fails to offer relief to plaintiffs with
potentially meritorious claims, and therefore makes it more likely that such
claims will be forever barred and corporate fraud undeterred. Courts should
adopt the Intermediate Approach precisely because it broadly applies the
actual text of the Uniform Standards Act with the general rules of procedure
in mind.
In contrast to the La Sala Approach, the Literalist and Intermediate
Approaches allow federal judges to quickly evaluate whether the claim meets
the standards for preclusion merely by asking: “Does this complaint allege
fraud or misrepresentation in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security?” As a result, the Literalist and Intermediate Approaches allow
courts to comport with both Dabit and the underlying policies of the Uniform
Standards Act by providing speedy application of a broad interpretation of
the statute.
B. Overcoming the Seventh Circuit’s Criticism of the Intermediate Approach
In Brown v. Calamos, the court explored the varying circuit approaches
before ultimately deciding to reject the Intermediate Approach, although it
failed to explicitly accept either of the two remaining approaches.182
Reviewing the Seventh Circuit’s analysis and exposing its weaknesses reveal
the true merits of the Intermediate Approach. As such, the following sections
present (1) the facts and procedural history of Brown, (2) the Seventh
Circuit’s analysis, (3) a critical examination of that analysis, and (4) the
consequences of adopting the Seventh Circuit’s logic.
1. Facts and Procedural History of Brown
The plaintiffs in Brown were common shareholders in the Calamos
Convertible Opportunities and Income Fund, a “closed-end investment fund”
principally comprised of two types of investors: common shareholders and
preferred stockholders.183 The preferred stockholders obtained their stock,
which was functionally “a form of bond,” through a regularly conducted
auction process.184 The Calamos Fund would then pool the capital of the nonliquid common stock and highly liquid preferred stock for investment.185
182.
183.
184.
185.

664 F.3d at 127-31.
Id. at 125.
Id.
Id.
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Because of the low interest rates secured through the auction process for
preferred stock, the Calamos Fund could make investments with a much
greater return than the interest rate owed to the holders of preferred stock,
which inured to the benefit of the common shareholders.186
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, those individuals holding preferred
stock did not have anyone to bid against to either unload the stock or adjust
the interest rate.187 As a result, they were stuck both with the stock and the
interest rate at the time of the crash, and “that interest rate was low.”188
“[T]hough it had no duty to do so,” the Calamos Fund and Calamos Advisors
(the Advisors) redeemed the preferred stock, and they redeemed it for a price
greater than market value.189 The Calamos Fund continued to operate and
make its investments for the benefit of the common shareholders, but the
money replacing the preferred stock investments was “borrowed at higher
interest rates” than the preferred stock had required, and it was “borrowed
short term.”190 This intensified the riskiness of the Calamos Fund, and as a
result, the riskiness of the common shareholders’ investment.191
Plaintiffs, common shareholders in the Calamos Fund, filed suit against
the Fund and its directors alleging that the fund redeemed the preferred stock
to benefit the other funds managed by the Advisors.192 To market the shares
of the other Calamos funds, the Advisors relied on banks and brokerage
houses “and so needed to maintain the good will of those entities.”193
Following the financial crisis, many entities faced peril through “lawsuits
both from regulatory agencies and from disappointed customers.”194 By
redeeming the shares, the Advisors were able to extend a safety raft to those
banks and brokerage houses, thus preserving those entities’ good will and the
marketability of the other Calamos Funds.195
The plaintiffs filed a class action in state court alleging state-law claims for
breach of fiduciary duty.196 Specifically, the “complaint allege[d] that
defendants breached their fiduciary duty to the Fund’s common
186. Id.
187. Id. at 126.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Brown v. Calamos, 777 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1129 (N.D. Ill. 2011), aff’d, 664 F.3d 123
(7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2774 (2012).
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shareholders . . . by causing the Fund to redeem certain preferred shares in a
manner that unfairly benefitted the preferred shareholders at the expense of
the common shareholders.”197 Defendants removed the action to federal court
in the Northern District of Illinois based on preclusion by the Uniform
Standards Act and immediately moved for dismissal.198 The district court
dismissed the claim upon finding that “the alleged misstatements are at the
heart of plaintiff’s claims, which thus fall squarely within [the Uniform
Standard Act]’s broad sweep.”199 The plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh
Circuit, where the court considered “whether the . . . complaint alleged the
misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the
purchase or sale of a covered security and that therefore [the Uniform
Standards Act] forbade the suit.”200
2. The Seventh Circuit Decision
Writing for the Seventh Circuit panel, Judge Posner illuminated the
reasons for affirming the opinion of the district court, which dismissed the
case with prejudice.201 Judge Posner first identified the allegation of
misrepresentations and omissions; namely, the Advisors had failed to inform
the common shareholders that, because of the Calamos Advisors’
management of multiple funds, the fund might have a conflict of interest that
required it to make decisions “motivated by the broader concerns of the entire
family of 20 Calamos mutual funds.”202 After establishing the existence of an
allegation of an omission, Judge Posner reviewed the circuit approaches to
determining at what point an allegation of omission or misrepresentation
dooms the suit, outlined supra.203 Although he skated past the Literalist and
La Sala Approaches, he paused in his discussion of the Intermediate
Approach’s dismissal without prejudice to voice the Seventh Circuit’s
concerns.204
The court’s primary concern was that if the suit were dismissed without
prejudice a state court might later be unable or reluctant to forbid the plaintiff
from “reinsert[ing] fraud allegations.”205 Judge Posner predicted the
197.
198.
199.
200.
(2012).
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1132.
Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 125 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2774
Id.
Id. at 127.
Id.; see supra Part III.B.1-3.
Brown, 664 F.3d at 127.
Id.
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following scenario: Following dismissal without prejudice at the federal
level, the plaintiffs would re-file in state court after eliminating all of their
offending allegations.206 Omission of such allegations would offer little
comfort, however, because “complaints [do not] strictly control the scope of
litigation” in modern jurisprudence.207 As a result, the state court would either
negligently fail to remove the action to federal court, or, perhaps equally
damaging, “allow removal of a complex commercial case after, maybe long
after, the pleadings stage had been concluded [which] would increase the
length and cost of litigation unreasonably.”208
Similarly, the court disposed of the plaintiffs’ argument that “dismissal of
a removed suit on the ground that the suit is barred by [the Uniform
Standards Act] is jurisdictional and therefore without prejudice.”209 In
Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, the Supreme Court included language that
one could reasonably interpret to indicate that preclusion is jurisdictional:
If the action is precluded, neither the district court nor the state
court may entertain it, and the proper course is to dismiss. If the
action is not precluded, the federal court likewise has no
jurisdiction to touch the case on the merits, and the proper course
is to remand to the state court that can deal with it.210
The Seventh Circuit explained, however, that the language was intended to
indicate merely that the only subject-matter jurisdiction the federal court
could have over an otherwise state-law action filed in state court and
potentially precluded by the Uniform Standards Act, would be “to determine
that it has no jurisdiction” because of the Uniform Standards Act.211 When
the federal court finds that the claim is precluded because of the Uniform
Standards Act, the Act serves “as an affirmative defense . . . on the merits.”212
The Seventh Circuit focused particularly on the Supreme Court’s word
“likewise” in this determination.213 It reasoned that by “likewise,” the Court
merely intended to instruct that federal courts lack the power to continue
adjudicating the claims and assess the merits of the state-law action, when the
district court has found that the Uniform Standards Act fails to bar the
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 127-28.
547 U.S. 633, 644 (2006).
Brown, 664 F.3d at 128.
Id.
Id.
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claim.214 After removal of a purely state-law claim based on Uniform
Standards Act preclusion, the district court’s jurisdiction over the claim
disappears once it has determined the impact of the Uniform Standards Act
on the case.215
The opinion also anticipated the criticism that “dismissal with prejudice is
too severe a sanction for what might be an irrelevancy added to the complaint
out of an anxious desire to leave no stone unturned.”216 The court responded
that lawyers filing fraud claims have the responsibility to know about, and
comply with, the preclusive mandate of the Uniform Standards Act.217 The
court noted that if an attorney added the misrepresentation or omission
allegations, he “must have thought the allegations added something to his
case.”218 If dismissal with leave to amend were permitted, the court
conceived that “maybe the state court will allow” the litigants to reintroduce
the fraud allegations, thereby permitting “state-court end runs around [the]
limitations [of] the [Reform Act].”219 Thus, the Seventh Circuit disposed of
the Intermediate Approach.
Because the court declined to explicitly adopt either the Literalist or the La
Sala Approach, it engaged in analysis of the potential success of the
plaintiffs’ breach of loyalty claim absent the allegations of fraud.220 The court
reasoned that “[t]he allegation of fraud would be difficult and maybe
impossible to disentangle from the charge of breach of the duty of loyalty that
the defendants owed their investors.”221 Disclosures regarding the Advisors’
potential conflict of interest, even if “full and accurate,” would still fail to
defeat “a claim of breach of the duty of loyalty because that duty is not
dissolved by disclosure.”222 The problem being that, although such a breach
of loyalty could be maintained, “it would have to be brought as a derivative
suit.”223 In other words, it was not that the plaintiffs’ claims of fraud were
necessary to their claim for breach of loyalty, but that those claims were
necessary to bringing a direct, as opposed to derivative, suit.224

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 128-30.
Id. at 129 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Uniform Standards Act does not bar derivative suits.225 In fact, the
Brown plaintiffs originally had the option of initiating such a suit instead of
their state-law claim class action; however the Seventh Circuit’s dismissal
with prejudice eliminated the opportunity to do so.226 Judge Posner offered an
explanation for the suit not being filed as derivate in the first place, however,
and those reasons are fairly compelling.227 Before the plaintiffs could file a
derivative suit, “[c]ounsel would be required to demand that the corporation’s
board authorize suit.”228 Most likely, the board would “form a special
litigation committee that after considering the question would decide that a
suit was not in the corporation’s best interest.”229 If plaintiffs did bring a
derivative suit, not only would it be exempt from the Uniform Standards Act
because of the exception for derivative suits, but it also would be exempt
because the derivative action would not require that the plaintiffs allege
fraud.230 A derivative action would be based on the argument “that the
executives had hurt the fund itself by reducing its profitability in order to
shore up the profitability of other funds in which they had interests.”231 The
requirement for board approval of a derivative claim, however, results in the
corporation being able to use fund assets, which are also the shareholder
assets, to form a committee to argue against shareholder recovery.232
Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the suit could not survive as
a direct suit without the allegations of fraud.233 Without the allegations of
fraud, the plaintiffs would be left claiming merely that the defendants
breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty when they financially benefitted from
their decision to redeem the preferred stock.234 Ultimately, “the fact that
management profits from an increase in the size of its enterprise is not a
breach of its duty of loyalty to shareholders.”235 As a result, the court
reasoned that the case was barred by the Uniform Standards Act under both
the Literalist and La Sala Approaches, because absent allegations of fraud,
plaintiffs’ claims “might not be plausible.”236
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1) (2012).
Brown, 664 F.3d at 129.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1.
Brown, 664 F.3d at 129-30.
Id. at 130.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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The court further buttressed its decision to dismiss with prejudice by
noting that the “forum manipulation” rule demanded it.237 The rule,
recognized by the Supreme Court in Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, is
triggered when a plaintiff attempts “to prevent the defendant from defending
in the court that obtained jurisdiction of the case on his initiative.”238 The
court did not explicitly state how this rule applied in this case, other than to
characterize any potential re-filing in state court by the plaintiffs as “pulling
the rug out from under your adversary’s feet.”239 Presumably, the defendants’
initiation of the removal to federal court meant that any re-filing in state court
would be contrary to the defendants’ intention, even though purely state-law
claims barred by the Uniform Standards Act may lack jurisdiction in the
defendants’ choice of forum.
3. Not So Fast: A Critical Examination of the Seventh Circuit’s Analysis
In its decision to reject the Intermediate Approach, the Seventh Circuit
missed the mark. Particularly, in support of the decision to dismiss Brown
with prejudice, the court returned repeatedly to the flawed argument that state
courts cannot be trusted to prevent allegations of fraud from reentering the
suit.240 The court further supported the decision to dismiss with prejudice by
expressing doubt as to the credibility of an attorney’s attempt to extract the
allegations of fraud.241 Effectively, such a concern holds securities litigators
to a higher pleading standard than attorneys practicing in other, often far less
complicated, fields of law. The forum manipulation concerns espoused by the
court were also unmerited, as those concerns ignore the fact that the Uniform
Standards Act itself is the antidote to forum manipulation. In reality, the best
way to respect the Supreme Court and congressional mandate to broadly
interpret the Act, while preserving the cases specifically omitted from the
Act, is to apply a broad interpretation of alleging fraud or misrepresentation
but to dismiss barred suits with leave to re-file amended complaints in state
court.
a) Rejecting the “Inadequate Discipline of State Courts” Argument
The court’s concerns about state courts’ capacity are disturbing. As a
policy matter, our federal justice system should not rest on the justification
that state court judges are incompetent. At the heart of the Seventh Circuit’s
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 131.
Id. (citing Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 474 n.6 (2007)).
Id.
See id. at 128, 131.
Id. at 128.
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concern was that state courts would be unable to control the scope of the suit
and might allow re-introduction of the fraud allegations down the road.242
Even if the scope of the litigation is not strictly controlled by the complaint,
as alleged by the Seventh Circuit, a state-court judge should have the power
to restrict introduction of evidence of fraud.243
An allegation asserted in the post-complaint stage of litigation would not
require removal merely for its assertion. At that point the judge could simply
deny its admission and limit the claim to the boundaries of the complaint,
thereby removing any concerns of Uniform Standards Act preclusion.
Moreover, even if a state-court judge wrongfully admits an allegation of
fraud or misrepresentation, it is almost incomprehensible that defendant’s
counsel would allow such an allegation to slip into litigation at any stage. The
defendant’s counsel would almost certainly be on-guard for any such
attempts, particularly after a successful dismissal in federal court based on
such allegations. This is not to say that it should be the defendant counsel’s
duty to ensure that the complaint complies with the Uniform Standards Act; it
is simply to say that if a state-court judge either failed to recognize or
permitted reinsertion of a claim of fraud, the defendant’s counsel would
surely serve as a backstop.
Even if the state court allowed allegations of fraud to permeate the suit
after the complaint stage, this worst-case scenario is still better than
dismissing suits that are likely meritorious, nonstrike suit cases. This is best
shown through example. Let us assume that the Brown plaintiffs successfully
re-file their complaint in state court without any allegations of fraud or
misrepresentation. If the claim is unable to survive a motion to dismiss absent
the allegations of fraud, then dismissal with prejudice will be appropriate at
that time. At least by then the plaintiffs will have had the opportunity to
amend their complaint to attempt to allege the breach of state law as they
originally intended.
Continuing with the example, in Judge Posner’s worst-case scenario the
plaintiffs would survive a motion to dismiss after removing the allegations of
fraud and then, down the line, reinsert allegations of fraud.244 In this scenario,
however, the plaintiffs will have established that their claim is not predicated
on allegations of fraud by surviving the motion to dismiss. In other words, the
plaintiffs will have shown that their claims can survive wholly without the
allegations of fraud or misrepresentation and that the underlying state-law
242. Id. at 127.
243. See, e.g., People v. Illgen, 583 N.E.2d 515, 519 (Ill. 1991) (“The admissibility of
evidence at trial is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court . . . .“).
244. Brown, 664 F.3d at 127.
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claim is almost certainly not the strike suit the Reform Act was designed to
eliminate. Instead, such claims are most likely meritorious state-law claims,
perhaps even fiduciary duty claims such as those in Brown. These fiduciary
duty claims provide an essential check on corporations and businesses,245 and
congressional intent that not all state-law corporate law class actions should
be precluded by the Uniform Standards Act is supported by the fact that the
Act itself does not bar all state-law securities class actions.246
b) Rejecting the “Attorneys Should Know Better” Argument
Dismissal without leave to amend is also not justified by the argument that
attorneys filing securities claims should be familiar with the contours of the
Uniform Standards Act. In theory, we hope that all attorneys are well versed
in the laws surrounding a suit they file. Nonetheless, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure create multiple opportunities for amendment, without stating
that attorneys should have known that their client’s claim was subject to a
motion to dismiss.247 Mandating that a litigator in the securities field, or even
a corporate lawyer bringing a suit that includes securities, shall not be given
an opportunity to revise their complaint would essentially hold securities
attorneys to higher standards than those practicing in other areas of law.
Moreover, the application of the Uniform Standards Act is not as easily
navigated or clearly established as Judge Posner indicates, as represented by
his own reference to the circuit split regarding when a complaint has alleged
fraud or misrepresentation.248 Even after Brown, plaintiffs’ attorneys cannot
predict whether the pleadings will be held to the standard of the entirely
distinct Literalist or La Sala Approaches.249 At the very least, they should be
permitted to amend if they guess incorrectly.

245. Cf. Lisa L. Casey, Twenty-Eight Words: Enforcing Corporate Fiduciary Duties
Through Criminal Prosecution of Honest Services Fraud, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 12 (2010)
(“Universally, as in Delaware, directors and officers owe fiduciary duties to their firms in
order to discipline managers’ self-interested conduct.”).
246. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(B)(i) (2012) (excluding class actions with fewer than
fifty members from Uniform Standards Act preclusion); see also 6 JEFFREY B. MALETTA &
NICHOLAS G. TERRIS, BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS § 68:38
(Robert L. Haig ed., 3d ed. 2012) (“[The Uniform Standards Act] does not reach all class
actions involving securities under state law.”).
247. FED. R. CIV. P. 15.
248. See supra Part III.
249. Brown, 664 F.3d at 130 (holding that the “suit is therefore barred by [the Uniform
Standards Act] under any reasonable standard” without explicitly choosing which standard
to apply).
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c) Rejecting the “Forum-Manipulation Rule” Argument
Finally, the forum-manipulation rule should be inapplicable to state-court
claims removed to federal court based purely on Uniform Standards Act
preclusion. In Rockwell, the Supreme Court supported the forummanipulation rule in a footnote.250 It mentioned that “when a defendant
removes a case to federal court based on the presence of a federal claim,” if
the plaintiff amends their complaint “eliminating the original basis for federal
jurisdiction,” the federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction typically remains
intact.251 This stands in contrast to the situation in which a plaintiff originally
filed a complaint in federal court and subsequently amended the complaint to
remove the basis for federal jurisdiction because “removal cases raise forummanipulation concerns that simply do not exist when it is the plaintiff who
chooses a federal forum.”252
Like in Brown, it is quite possible that in Uniform Standards Act
preclusion cases the only ground for federal jurisdiction will be Uniform
Standards Act preclusion.253 Even if the defendant wanted to adjudicate the
case in federal court, if the only ground for removal is Uniform Standards
Act preclusion, then once the claim avoids or succumbs to the preclusion,
federal courts no longer have subject-matter jurisdiction. Any subsequent refiling of the claim in state court once the allegations of fraud had been
removed would not be for the purpose of preventing the defendant from
litigating in the forum of his choice. The re-filing necessarily must be in state
court because the federal courts lack jurisdiction over the claim. After all,
“[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.”254 Because re-filing in
state court would be required for jurisdictional reasons, the “forum
manipulation” rule has no place in the context of the Uniform Standards Act
preclusion.
d) Drawing Attention to Importance of the Uniform Standards Act’s
Statutory Exceptions
Many of the concerns addressed so far can be traced to a misunderstanding
of the nature of the Uniform Standards Act itself. As explained in Part III, the
Uniform Standards Act was designed to be the antidote to the shift in class-

250. Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 474 n.6 (2007).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See Notice of Removal at 3-7, Brown v. Calamos, 777 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Ill.
2011) (No. 1:10-cv-06558), 2010 WL 4236606.
254. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
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action securities filings to state rather than federal court.255 In designing this
antidote, the drafters decided to leave some state authority unhindered.256
In fact, the Uniform Standards Act provides exceptions from its preclusion
to “certain class actions based on the law of the State in which the issuer of
the covered security is incorporated, actions brought by a state agency or
state pension plan, actions under contracts between issuers and indenture
trustees, and derivative actions brought by shareholders on behalf of a
corporation.”257 When plaintiffs amend their complaint to meet one of these
exceptions, they have modified their claim to fall within the carve-outs
specifically permitted by Congress. In other words, courts should not
consider plaintiffs to have engaged in strategic evasion of the Reform Act
when they amend their complaint in substance to avoid Uniform Standards
Act preclusion.
The Seventh Circuit specifically has recognized that leave to amend
should be denied “only if it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff cannot
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”258 In Brown, it was not
established with certainty that the plaintiffs could not extract their allegations
of fraud from their state-law claims. The court hypothesized that it “would be
difficult and maybe impossible” to eliminate the allegations of fraud and
successfully plead breach of the duty of loyalty.259 Most notably in its
holding, the Seventh Circuit wrote that absent allegations of fraud, plaintiffs’
claims “might not be plausible.”260 These observations fall short of certainty.
In fact, the opinion expressly admitted that if the case were dismissed without
prejudice, plaintiffs could have “refiled as a derivate suit.”261 In other words,
the court admitted that the plaintiffs in Brown may have been the victims of a
cognizable injury for which the law provides a remedy. Even in light of this,
the Seventh Circuit was unwilling to dismiss without prejudice. Such a
disposition smacks of vindictiveness for the perceived abuses by those who
preceded these plaintiffs, not adherence to broad interpretation of the
Uniform Standards Act or any of the other reasons cited by the court in
Brown.
255. See supra Part III.C-D.
256. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 87-88 (2006)
(citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78bb(f)(3)(A)-(C), (f)(5)(C)).
257. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78bb(f)(3)(A)-(C), (f)(5)(C)) (emphasis added).
258. Rohler v. TRW, Inc., 576 F.2d 1260, 1266 (7th Cir. 1978); see also Barry Aviation
Inc. v. Land O’Lakes Mun. Airport Comm’n, 377 F.3d 682, 687 n.3 (7th Cir. 2004).
259. Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 129 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2774
(2012) (emphasis added).
260. Id. at 130 (emphasis added).
261. Id. at 129.
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It seems directly contrary to the statute to dismiss with prejudice a claim
that could be filed as a derivative action. A broad interpretation of the Act is
essential, in fact mandated, to ensure that its remedial purpose is not
circumvented by artful pleading. Not all amendments, however, would
necessarily amount to attempting to hide the substance of the claim. For
example, allowing a suit without allegations of fraud to proceed would not
amount to valuing substance over form. Similarly, a class action meeting all
other requirements but with less than fifty members would not fall under the
preclusion. Given the mandatory broad interpretation of the Act, it is
necessary to give weight both to the exceptions to the statute as well as the
preclusions.
4. Potential Consequences of Brown: Cognizable State Legal Claims
Denied a Remedy by the Federal Government
Brown is already being cited for the proposition that federal courts should
dismiss with prejudice suits precluded by the Uniform Standards Act.262 Such
a blanket categorization of the holding in Brown may prove imminently
dangerous to meritorious claims caught in the Uniform Standards Act’s net.
This danger reaches beyond traditional securities law into traditional state
law, like corporate fiduciary duty liability, that may happen to touch
securities. In Dabit, the Supreme Court dismissed breach of contract and
fiduciary duty claims with prejudice in part because state law had not been
the traditional “vehicle for asserting class-action securities fraud claims.”263
While that statement is in fact correct, it is only one way of looking at the
issue. Although class-action securities fraud claims were not traditionally
brought in state court, corporate fiduciary duty claims certainly have been.264
It is much like the assertion made by securities law reform advocates that
class actions were not contemplated by the drafters of the Securities Act of

262. See, e.g., DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND
PRACTICE § 2:2 n.64 (2012) (characterizing Brown as “noting that deletion of fraud claim
would lack credibility, given facts alleged in complaint and might open gate to forum
manipulation”); 1 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 2.44 n.7 (9th
ed. 2012) (citing Brown for the proposition that suits preempted by the Uniform Standards
Act should be dismissed with prejudice).
263. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 88 (2006).
264. Cf. Jeffrey Baddeley, Defending Directors and Officers Against Breach of Fiduciary
Duty Claims in Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG LAW (2012), http://about.bloomberglaw.com/
practitioner-contributions/defending-directors-and-officers-against-breach-of-fiduciary-dutyclaims-in-bankruptcy/ (“Delaware courts have identified three categories of bad faith
corporate fiduciary conduct . . . .”).
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1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934.265 Again, this is true, but it disregards
the fact that the engineers of the class-action device certainly contemplated,
in fact emphasized, the application of the class-action device to securities
fraud.266 Much the same way, even though securities class actions have not
traditionally found their forum in state court, fiduciary duty class actions
traditionally have.267
In Brown, the plaintiffs brought a state-law breach of fiduciary duty
claim.268 They should have been permitted at least one opportunity postremoval to delete the allegations of fraud and pursue their claim, which was
ultimately an issue of state law, in state court. It does not make sense to
require federal appellate courts to make searching inquiries into whether the
claim would be dismissed at the state court level without the assertions of
fraud. That is a decision for state courts. Similarly, if courts adopt the
reasoning of the Seventh Circuit, many injured investors could be denied
relief, just as the plaintiffs were in Brown. State fiduciary duty laws are
intended to deter fraud and self-dealing by directors, but when the Uniform
Standards Act is improperly applied, the result may be to prevent those
liability laws from serving their purpose.269
V. Conclusion
The superior approach to Uniform Standards Act preclusion analysis
would be to respect the broad sweep of the statute created by Congress while
permitting the opportunity to amend the claim at least once. As such, the
Seventh Circuit should not have dismissed Brown with prejudice or
categorically implied that all cases precluded by the Uniform Standards Act
should be dismissed with prejudice. Although the court conducted an indepth fact analysis to determine whether the claim could survive without the
allegations of fraud, which could be interpreted to suggest that determinations
to dismiss with or without prejudice should be made on a case-by-case basis,
the remainder of the opinion disposes of that option.

265. Perino, supra note 21, at 283.
266. YEAZELL, supra note 33, at 232 (citing Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The
Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684 (1941)).
267. See Casey, supra note 245, at 9 (“This part identifies the significant legal obstacles
preventing shareholders from enforcing management’s fiduciary duties in state court or
federal court, whether shareholders bring their claims derivatively or as class actions.”)
268. Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 125 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2774
(2012).
269. See Casey, supra note 245, at 17.
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By dismissing cases with prejudice in federal court because a federal judge
is not certain that the plaintiffs could amend their complaint to remove the
allegations of fraud from their state-law claim, the plaintiffs and the state
court are denied the opportunity to work within the bounds of state law. The
state court is denied the opportunity to interpret and apply state law. The
plaintiffs are denied the opportunity to access the state courthouse in the most
cost-effective form of suit, the class action. Originally, the plaintiffs remained
free to sue in state court with a class of less than fifty people or to bring the
action in federal court and meet the high pleading requirements of the
Reform Act. A dismissal with prejudice, however, eliminates those
opportunities for the aggrieved plaintiffs, and as a result, corporate fraud may
go undeterred.
Selby P. Brown
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